

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY BONN

S E C R E T STATE 194490

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION USMISSION NATO 29 SEP REPEATED TO YOU
QUOTE:

E.O. 11652: GDS

TATS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: COVERING NOTE TO PAPER ON NEGOTIATED IN-
SPECTION IN MBFR

1. MISSION IS AUTHORIZED TO CIRCULATE PAPER ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION (TEXT POUCHED TO GOODBY UNDER REGISTRY NUMBER 2124753), USING ITS DISCRETION AS TO TIMING SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH ADOPTION OF BASIC ALLIANCE APPROACH PAPER. PAPER SHOULD BE TABLED FIRST IN SPC WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING AN ALLIED DISCUSSION IN COMING WEEKS ON THE BASIS OF WHICH US WOULD FORMULATE FURTHER VIEWS.

2. TEXT OF THE COVER NOTE TO BE USED IN CIRCULATING THE PAPER FOLLOWS:

3. BEGIN TEXT:

THE US PAPER OF APRIL 30, RECONFIRMED BY THE US PAPER OF 27 JULY, ADVANCED THE POSITION THAT ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, AMONG WHICH AGREEMENT ON NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IS THE MOST ESSENTIAL. FURTHER, THE 30 APRIL

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PAPER STATED THE US POSITION THAT WE WOULD NOT BE WILL-

ING TO ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL FOR MBFR WHICH WOULD DEPEND CRITICALLY ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES TO MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. RATHER, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO RELY ON NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THUS, THERE MUST AT A MINIMUM BE AGREEMENT WITH THE PACT ON NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

4. IN THE PAPER, THE US ALSO STATED WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WITH THE ALLIES THE POSSIBILITY OF PROPOSING AT AN EARLY POINT IN NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC MEASURES:

-- FEWER RESTRICTIONS ON NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHES AND MLM'S;

-- OBSERVATION OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS BY NATIONAL ATTACHES AND/OR SPECIAL GROUND OBSERVATION TEAMS CONSTITUTED FOR THIS PURPOSE;

-- SPECIAL MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREAS IN THE POST MBFR PERIOD;

-- LIGHT AIR CAPABILITY (HELICOPTERS) FOR MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS.

5. WE HAVE NOW COMPLETED A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THESE AND OTHER MEASURES; OPEN SKIES, FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS, AND USE OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT FOR OBSERVATION. THE TEXT OF THE ANALYSIS IS ATTACHED. WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO GIVE DETAILED CONSIDERATION TO POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OR DISADVANTAGES OF PUTTING FORWARD A PROPOSAL ON ONE OR ANOTHER OF THESE MEASURES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. THE ALLIES MUST ASSUME THAT, IF THE SOVIETS ACCEPT NEGOTIATED INSPECTION, ANY MEASURES AGREED WOULD BE APPLIED RECIPROCALLY. AS WE SUGGESTED IN OUR APRIL 30 PAPER, THE ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

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AA WHAT LOSS OF TECHNOLOGY OR CLASSIFIED OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, IF ANY, WILL OCCUR AS A RESULT OF ANY PROPOSED VERIFICATION MEASURES?

-- WILL ANY RESULTING DISADVANTAGES FROM VERIFICATION BE EQUAL IN THEIR EFFECTS ON BOTH SIDES?

-- TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD NATO FOREGO IMPROVED VERIFIABILITY IN ORDER TO STRUCTURE ITS OWN REDUCTIONS IN A WAY LEAST DAMAGING TO ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES?

7. THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBLE GAINS IN INFORMATION ON WARSAW PACT FORCES THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED.

8. THE ALLIES WILL ALSO NEED TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO TACTICS. TO GAIN SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION WILL BE DIFFICULT, IF IT PROVES POSSIBLE AT ALL. THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO AVOID OUTRIGHT SOVIET REJECTION OF POSSIBLE ALLIED PROPOSALS AT THE OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO VERIFICATION TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS LINKED TO REDUCTION MEASURES WHOSE SUBSTANCE THEY MAY HAVE ALREADY AGREED ON. THE US BELIEVES, FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS TO ALLOW THE ALLIES TIME TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE CONSEQUENCES TO THEM OF MAKING A GIVEN PROPOSAL, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD PRESERVE FLEXIBILITY ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION, LIMITING THEIR PRESENTATION AT THE OUTSET TO THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IN GENERAL TERMS. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN, IN ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE, THE ALLIES COULD RELATE THEM TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS.

9. IF THE ALLIES AGREE, THE US WOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO MAKE A DETERMINED EFFORT IN THE NEGOTIATION TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT BOTH TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION AND TO A WORKABLE AND USEFUL SYSTEM OF INSPECTION, WITH FINAL DETAILS DEPENDENT ON THE FORM OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

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QPM WE BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO REVIEW MEASURES DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED TECHNICAL STUDY. A PROPOSAL TO THE EAST ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MIGHT BE BASED ON ONE OR A COMBINATION OF THEM. HOW THE ALLIES MIGHT TACTICALLY HANDLE A PROPOSAL TO THE EAST ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IS A SEPARATE ISSUE WHICH WILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED ONCE THE ALLIES HAVE DECIDED WHETHER THEY WISH TO PUT FORWARD SUCH PROPOSALS AND WHICH ONES. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO FIRST SEEK EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE GENERAL SCOPE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE VERIFICATION TASKS, AND TURN TO THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD CARRY THEM OUT ONLY AFTER AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED. DURING DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC WITH THE EAST, WE WILL WANT TO AVOID SITUATIONS

WHICH COULD PUT IN QUESTION THE STATUS OF MLM'S
AND ATTACHES. END TEXT OF COVER NOTE. KISSINGER. UNQUOTE.
RUSH

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